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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant has failed to show that she needs alimony to 
purchase a new vehicle because she voluntarily allows her daughter 
to drive a nearly new, debt-free Hyundai automobile. If plaintiff 
did not allow the parties' adult daughter to drive the Hyundai, the 
defendant would have no need for a new vehicle. The defendant 
actually seeks to be paid three times by plaintiff for her purchase 
of the Hyundai. 
In addition to the new automobile that defendant provides for 
the parties' adult daughter, the defendant's support of her adult 
children extends substantially beyond the defendant's fixed 
expenses. At least $1,100 could be trimmed from the defendant's 
list of necessary expenses if the defendant's support of the adult 
children is not included. 
The parties did not support their children as adults during 
their marriage. Their oldest child was only 16 at the time of the 
divorce. Defendant's assertion that plaintiff must continue to pay 
for the support of the parties' adult children through alimony 
because the children were supported during the marriage ignores all 
case law and statutory authority regarding the bases for awarding 
alimony. 
The defendant lacks the discretion to unilaterally include the 
support of the adult children in her necessary expenses for alimony 
purposes. Defendant confuses a custodial parent's discretion in 
spending child support payments with the factors that determine the 
amount of alimony. The two areas simply are not related. 
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Finally, the trial court was justified in presuming that the 
defendant had sufficient income to provide for her needs based on 
the defendant's refusal to identify her expenses at trial without 
also including the support of the adult children. The trial court 
erred only in allowing the defendant's support of the adult 
children to be included in her alimony award until November of 
1992. Accordingly, the trial court's award of alimony until 
November of 1992 should be reversed and the defendant's alimony 
award should be lowered to $1 per month as of Octobei: 30, 1989. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant Roy B. Moore has only cross-
appealed the issue of whether the trial court erred in including 
the defendant's support of the parties' capable adult children as 
part of the defendant's necessary expenses in determining alimony. 
The defendant's reply brief has raised several new matters 
regarding this issue in response to plaintiff's appellate brief. 
Although plaintiff strongly contests all arguments presented in 
defendant's reply brief, plaintiff replies pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24 (c) only to those new matters raised by 
defendant that specifically relate to plaintiff's cross-appeal. 
Plaintiff replies to the arguments in the order they have been 
presented in defendant's reply brief. 
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POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT MAY NOT ASSERT A CLAIM FOR ALIMONY BASED ON 
AN ALLEGED NEED FOR A NEW AUTOMOBILE WHERE SHE 
VOLUNTARILY ALLOWS HER CAPABLE ADULT DAUGHTER TO DRIVE 
ANOTHER NEW VEHICLE THAT SHE OWNS. 
Defendant asserts that she needs alimony to purchase a new 
vehicle, even though she allows her capable adult daughter to drive 
her nearly new, debt-free Hyundai automobile. Defendant contends 
in her reply brief that she purchased the Hyundai with funds that 
she received from the sale of the parties home' which she was 
awarded as part of her property distribution award. She asserts 
that since she was awarded the home, she was free to give her 
equity to her adult child without affecting her alimony award. 
(Defendant's Reply Brief at 7-9.) Several flaws exist in 
defendant's reasoning. 
First, defendant's rationale ignores that an alimony award 
must be based on the three factors set forth in Jones v. Jones, 700 
P. 2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) . Two of the three factors are at issue 
in the present case: (1) the financial condition and needs of the 
receiving spouse; and (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce sufficient income for him- or herself. 
If the defendant has excess resources sufficient to allow her 
adult daughter to drive the defendant's debt-free Hyundai, then 
defendant, by definition, must not have the financial need to 
require plaintiff to provide her with alimony for a new car. The 
defendant not only has financial resources sufficient for her own 
needs, she also has enough resources to provide a nearly new 
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vehicle for one of the parties' adult children. Therefore, 
defendant fails the first factor in determining alimony. 
Second, defendant has failed to show that she is not capable 
of providing a vehicle for herself if her support of the adult 
children is not included in the her needs. The defendant earned in 
excess of $23,000 annually at the time of trial on the petition to 
modify. (R. 247). This salary should be more than sufficient to 
support the defendant at the same standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage. However, because defendant consciously refused at 
trial to itemize only her financial needs without including the 
support of the adult children (R. 357; 369), the court simply could 
not determine whether the defendant's salary was sufficient to meet 
only her needs. The trial court, accordingly, could presume that 
the defendant had sufficient resources to meet her needs and buy 
her own vehicle. The defendant fails the second factor in 
determining alimony. 
Third, defendant implies that plaintiff somehow is responsible 
for the purchase of the Hyundai because he stopped paying alimony 
for a short time-period after he filed his petition to modify. 
Defendant asserts that she was forced to purchase the Hyundai 
through utilizing the equity in her home. Defendant's rationale 
is not entirely clear to plaintiff because defendant apparently 
asserts that she was entitled to purchase the Hyundai for the 
parties' adult daughter through alimony funds, the exact issue that 
plaintiff now contests. In any event, plaintiff paid all amounts 
of alimony that were past due as ordered by the lower court. If 
defendant had in fact been required to substitute her equity in her 
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home to obtain the vehicle, then she should have been able to 
restore the equity in the home when the alimony was ultimately 
paid. 
Defendant actually seeks to be paid three times by plaintiff 
for the Hyundai. First, by moving to an upgraded condominium and 
taking equity from her home for the purchase of the Hyundai, 
defendant has increased her monthly house payment (including 
insurance and association fees) by approximately $237, from $350 to 
$587. (R. 352-353.) Defendant has included this increased payment 
in her living expenses. Second, defendant was paid for the Hyundai 
when plaintiff paid the delinquent alimony. Third, defendant now 
seeks to have the plaintiff pay for a new vehicle because defendant 
has given the Hyundai to the parties' daughter to drive. She seeks 
to have the plaintiff pay for the vehicle once through her 
increased house payment, second through the alimony actually paid 
by plaintiff, and third through a reserve payment for a new 
vehicle. Such a triple counting of the defendant's automobile 
needs is clearly unfair to plaintiff. 
Finally, but for the defendant's providing the debt-free 
Hyundai to the parties' adult daughter, the defendant would have a 
new vehicle of her own to drive. If the defendant kept and 
utilized this vehicle, then defendant would have no need for 
plaintiff to provide her with a new vehicle through alimony. The 
defendant cannot expect to give away her property and still make a 
claim for alimony to make up the difference. Therefore, the 
defendant may not assert a claim for alimony based on the need for 
a new vehicle. 
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POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT'S SUPPORT OF HER CAPABLE ADULT CHILDREN EXTENDS 
SUBSTANTIALLY BEYOND HER FIXED EXPENSES. 
Defendant implies in her reply brief that she would have the 
same expenses regardless of whether the adult children lived with 
her because her expenses for "condo payment, gas payment, electric 
payment, sewer payment, etc." would remain unaffected by the number 
of people living in her home. (Defendant's Reply Brief at 13). 
This implication ignores the undisputed facts presented at trial. 
As explained above, the defendant included $3 0 0 as a reserve fund 
in her necessary expenses to allow her to purchase a new automobile 
because her 1984 Regal is worn out (R. 367-368) , even though she 
allows her daughter to drive her nearly new, debt-free Hyundai. (R. 
354-355.) Obviously, this $300 reserve "expense" would not exist 
if the defendant did not allow her adult daughter to drive the 
Hyundai. 
Similarly, the defendant admitted at trial that her monthly 
"household" expenses of $486.48 consisted primarily of food and 
sundries for her and the adult children. (R. 416.) The defendant 
also admitted at trial that her "charge accounts" expense of 
$468.97 per month consisted primarily of clothing for herself and 
the adult children. (R. 3 56; 424.) These expenses simply cannot 
be considered as fixed. They vary in direct proportion to the 
number of people that the defendant chooses to support. In 
reality, the adult children likely consume even more than two-
thirds of household and charge account amounts because the 
defendant also lists another $380 per month for unspecified 
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personal expenses. The defendant would have no need for such large 
personal expenditures if her support of the two adult children did 
not consume the vast majority of her household and clothing 
expenses. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the defendant needed a food and 
household budget of $200 per month, an ample clothing budget of 
$150 per month, and an unspecified personal expense budget of $150 
per month to support only herself, over $83 0 per month would be cut 
from the list of defendant's necessary expenses contained in 
Finding of Fact No. 8. If the defendant also chose to drive the 
Hyundai she now provides for her daughter, an additional $3 0 0 would 
be trimmed from the defendant's list of expenses. These savings 
alone total in excess of $1,130 per month. 
Without an alimony award the defendant still has sufficient 
income to meet her needs. She still has sufficient income to pay 
for her condominium mortgage payment and condominium fees. These 
payments total $237 more per month than the mortgage payment on the 
parties' marital home (which defendant was awarded at the time of 
divorce) . She still has sufficient income to pay $187 per month in 
utilities. She still has sufficient income to pay nearly $200 per 
month in uninsured medical bills. She still has $100 per month to 
pay her gas and automobile maintenance. She still has sufficient 
income to meet her insurance needs. In short, the defendant earns 
sufficient income to meet all her financial needs if her support of 
the parties' capable adult children is not included in her list of 
necessary expenses. 
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POINT III. 
THE PARTIES DID NOT SUPPORT ABLE-BODIED ADULT CHILDREN 
DURING THE MARRIAGE. 
Defendant argues that because the parties provided benefits to 
their children while they were married, "the plaintiff may not 
argue that it is inappropriate to do the same, aside from child 
support, after the Divorce." (Defendant's Reply Brief at 15). 
This argument fails in two important areas. First, the parties' 
children were not adults during the marriage. The parties' oldest 
child, Jeffrey B. Moore, was just 16 at the time of the divorce. 
The parties had a legal obligation to support their minor children. 
The parties did not support any individuals during the marriage 
that they did not have an obligation to support. 
The defendant, accordingly, cannot assert that the parties 
were voluntarily supporting other adults as part of their standard 
of living during their marriage. When the parties' children 
reached the age of majority, the parties no longer had any 
obligation to support them. The defendant cannot unilaterally 
foist this obligation on the plaintiff by including the support for 
the adult children as part of her necessary expenses. 
Second, Utah law is very clear that the purpose of alimony is 
to provide support for the receiving spouse based on the receiving 
spouse's needs and financial condition, the receiving spouse's 
ability to provide sufficient income for him- or herself, and the 
ability of the providing spouse to provide support. Gramme v. 
Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979). Plaintiff is unaware of a 
single case or statutory authority that would allow the indirect 
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imposition of child-support of capable adult children through 
disguised alimony. Nor has defendant cited any such authority. 
Indeed, defendant totally ignores the authorities cited in 
plaintiff's prior brief that clearly hold that the only needs to be 
considered in determining alimony are the needs of the receiving 
spouse. Defendant also ignores the cases which hold that parents' 
child support obligations cease when their capable children reach 
the age of 18, Ferguson v. Ferguson, 578 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978); 
Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864 (Utah 1978), and that child 
support cannot be indirectly ordered through the payment of 
alimony. Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1984) . 
Moreover, the defendant could not make a claim for alimony 
based on the support of her children even if they were still 
minors. Alimony is spousal support. It is not intended for the 
support of children. Child support is a completely separate 
obligation and defendant could not include her support of minor 
children as part of her necessary expenses for purposes of alimony. 
Absolutely no legal basis exists for continuing an award of 
disguised child-support for capable adult children through alimony. 
Therefore, no basis exists in either fact or law for awarding 
alimony to defendant to enable her to support the parties' adult 
children. 
POINT IV. 
THE SUPPORT OF THE PARTIES' ADULT CHILDREN IS NOT A 
DISCRETIONARY ACT THAT WARRANTS AN AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
Defendant asserts that she has the discretion to use alimony 
in any way she chooses and that "no one can argue that alimony is 
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justified if it benefits the family dog" or the parties' able 
bodied adult children. (Defendant's Reply Brief at 16) . Plaintiff 
does not dispute the defendant's right to spend her own funds as 
she sees fit, but plaintiff strongly opposes the defendant's 
claimed right to increase the amount of her alimony award by 
including in her expenses the support of adult children. 
Defendant apparently confuses the determination of alimony 
with a custodial parent's discretion to use child-support payments. 
Child support generally is based solely on parents' income 
according to the Utah Child Support Guidelines contained in Utah 
Code Annotated section 78-45-7.14. After the amount of child 
support is fixed, a custodial parent typically has the discretion 
to use the child support payment as the custodial parent sees fit. 
In contrast, the amount of an alimony award is based on the 
receiving spouse's needs and ability to support him- or herself. 
If the receiving spouse were granted discretion to include in his 
or her needs virtually anything they desired, including the support 
of their adult children, the receiving spouse would have sole 
discretion in determining the amount of the alimony award. This 
obviously could lead to very unjust burdens on the providing 
spouse. Yet that is exactly the discretion that the defendant 
claims to have in the present case. Plaintiff is unaware of any 
case law or statutory authority that would permit the defendant to 
exercise such broad discretion. 
The defendant likens her complete care and support of two 
adult children to caring for her family pet. As explained above, 
it appears that the defendant currently pays in excess of $1,100 
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per month toward the support of the adult children. This 
substantial support amount simply is not on the same scale as 
caring for the family pet. Plaintiff, therefore, requests this 
Court to reject the defendant's argument that she has the 
discretion to include in her financial needs the support of her 
adult children. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF 
DEFENDANT'S ALIMONY AWARD IN LIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
REFUSAL TO SPECIFY THE AMOUNT OF ONLY HER NEEDS. 
The defendant's reply brief essentially follows the same 
approach taken by the defendant at trial with respect to the 
inclusion of her support of the two adult children as part of her 
necessary expenses. The defendant does not deny that she has 
included the support of the children in her expenses. Nor does the 
defendant point to any evidence that would indicate what her 
expenses would be without including the support of the adult 
children. 
At trial, the defendant consciously elected to not even 
attempt to identify what her expenses would be without including 
the support of her adult children. She refused to identify her 
expenses despite substantial questioning from plaintiff's counsel 
to determine her needs. (R. 357; 369.) In light of the 
defendant's refusal to identify only her needs without including 
the support of the adult children, there were ample grounds for the 
trial court to conclude that the defendant had sufficient resources 
to provide for herself. 
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The trial court erred only in permitting the defendant's 
support of the adult children to be included in her alimony award 
until November of 1992. (See R. 216). Plaintiff, accordingly, 
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's grant of alimony 
to defendant until November of 1992 and order that alimony be 
reduced to $1 as of the date plaintiff filed his petition to 
modify, October 30, 1989. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's issue on cross-appeal clearly constitutes a 
question of law. The defendant does not dispute that she has 
included the support of the parties' capable adult children as part 
of her claimed necessary expenses. Nor does she dispute that the 
trial court included the support of the adult children in the 
defendant's expenses when it ordered the plaintiff to continue to 
pay alimony until November of 1992. Rather, defendant asserts that 
she has the right to include the support of the adult children in 
her expenses because the parties supported the children while they 
were minors during the marriage. 
Defendant wholly ignores the case law and policy arguments 
advanced by plaintiff in his prior brief. Utah law is very clear 
that alimony is based on the receiving spouse's needs and ability 
to support him- or herself, not the needs of capable adult 
children. Moreover, allowing support of adult children to be 
included in the determination of alimony would substantially 
pervert public policy regarding the independence of adults and 
confuse existing law on child support and alimony as set forth in 
plaintiff's prior brief. Defendant has failed to contest these 
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policy concerns or statements in existing law. Plaintiff, 
therefore, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the lower 
court and order that the defendant's alimony award be reduced to $1 
per month as of October 30, 1989 based on the trial court's finding 
of a substantial change of in the defendant's circumstances. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of June, 1993. 
CAMPBELLr^MAACK 8c SESSP3SS 
C£AR£ w. sE'ssio: 
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